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Abstract—Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS) is a novel sensing
scenario of Cyber-Physical-Social Systems. MCS has been widely
adopted in smart cities, personal health care, and environment
monitor areas. MCS applications recruit participants to obtain
sensory data from the target area by allocating reward to them.
Reward mechanisms are crucial in stimulating participants to
join and provide sensory data. However, while the MCS applica-
tions execute the reward mechanisms, sensory data and personal
private information can be in great danger, because of malicious
task initiators/participants and hackers. This work proposes a
novel blockchain-based MCS framework that preserves privacy
and which secures both the sensing process and the incentive
mechanism by leveraging the emergent blockchain technology.
Moreover, to provide a fair incentive mechanism, this paper has
considered an MCS scenario as a sensory data market, where the
market separates the participants into two categories: monthly-
pay participants and instant-pay participants. By analysing
two different kinds of participants and the task initiator, this
paper proposes an incentive mechanism aided by a three-stage
Stackelberg game. Through theoretical analysis and simulation,
the evaluation addresses two aspects: the reward mechanism and
the performance of the blockchain-based MCS. The proposed
reward mechanism achieves up to a ten percent improvement of
the task initiator’s utility compared with a traditional Stackelberg
game. It can also maintain the required market share for
monthly-pay participants whilst achieving sustainable sensory
data provision. The evaluation of the blockchain-based MCS
shows that the latency increases in a tolerable manner as the
number of participants grows. Finally, the paper discusses the
future challenges of blockchain-based MCS.
Index Terms—Mobile crowdsensing, blockchain, reward mech-
anism, Stackelberg game, sensory data market
I. INTRODUCTION
THE development of network technology, sensing devices,and social networks has increased the deployment of
the next generation of Internet of Things (IoT) – Mobile
CrowdSensing (MCS). MCS is a novel sensing framework,
which is assisted by smartphone sensors and with the inclusion
of human intelligence in the loop. MCS has become a typi-
cal application in Cyber-Physical-Social Systems (CPSS) [1],
[2] because it adopts the multi-disciplinary approach where
knowledge from communication, computer science, computer
network, economic, psychology, and social research unite to
provide a solution of a sensing task.
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Compared with traditional IoT Frameworks, MCS has the
advantages of broad sensing coverage, spatiotemporality of
sensory data, feasibility and flexibility of deployment, and so
on. MCS has been widely adopted in different scenarios, such
as personal health care [3], smart cities [4], [5], environmental
monitoring [6] and disaster recovery [7], [8]. Furthermore,
it has drawn the attention of both academia and industry.
The challenges in MCS that have been studied include: the
incentive mechanism [9], sensory data transmission [10], sens-
ing tasks execution [11], [12] and offloading [13], quality of
sensory data [14], and coverage [15].
MCS is becoming an essential part of daily life, it collects
the sensory data along with the participants’ private data
(such as location data). The leakage of participants’ private
data is inherent when participants join an MCS application.
Additionally, an MCS scenario faces several challenges during
deployment and operation:
1) Untrustworthy participants: A participant who may forge
his identity or reputation, for example, adversary attack.
A malicious participant may steal sensory data causing
privacy leakage.
2) Untrustworthy task initiator: A task initiator may publish
a sensing task without a reward guarantee, it may also try
to steal the private information from participants when
there is communication between them.
3) Untrustworthy reward transaction: Due to the mobility
of participants in MCS, the reward allocation procedure
will be disturbed when a mobile user/participant moves
from one target area to another. As a result, a participant
will have difficulty in redeeming his/her reward.
4) High operational cost of the system: MCS needs an
authority to process all the communications between the
sensing task initiator and the participants. Considering
the architecture of MCS is usually centralised, MCS
may suffer a single point failure and add additional
operational cost to the whole scenario.
To address the above privacy and security challenges, this
paper has proposed a blockchain-based reward mechanism to
provide privacy and security features to the MCS. The concept
of Bitcoin [16] has drawn more attention than blockchain
technology. Bitcoin was created in 2009, following with a
white paper which provided all the details of blockchain
technology. Blockchain technology is a disruptive technology
and often stated to be the fifth computing revolution after the
mainframe, personal computer, internet and social networking
[17]. The vital feature of the blockchain technology is that it is
a distributed ledger that records transactions in a conventional
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and permanent way, which makes it a potential solution for a
distributed sensing scenario.
Blockchain technology has the potential to collaborate with
the MCS because it operates the transactions in a decen-
tralised, anonymous, and trustful fashion [18]. Firstly, by
adopting blockchain technology, it will reduce the additional
cost of the third party in MCS. Secondly, considering the
anonymity feature of blockchain, it can protect the partici-
pants’ private information when they participate in the sensing
task. Last but not least, the smart contract [19] can support the
automation of sensing task allocation, participant selection,
sensing task execution, and reward allocation. The smart
contract can make it easier for the intricate reward allocation.
We will address this in detail in the next section.
This work proposes a blockchain-based MCS which can
achieve participant identity anonymization, decentralised re-
wards allocation, and transparent transactions without an or-
dinary trusted third party. The main contribution of this work
involves three aspects:
• Proposing a blockchain-based MCS framework, which
provides the protection of participants’ privacy, as well as
a secure sensing process and rewards allocation mecha-
nism by leveraging the novel blockchain technology. The
proposed work uses hybrid base stations as miners to
verify and validate the identities of the participants and
the sensing task, the sensing procedure, and the reward
allocation.
• Designing the workflow of blockchain-based MCS and
a set of smart contracts to assist the sensing task execu-
tion automation of MCS. Once all the identities of the
participants are verified on the blockchain, the sensing
task execution procedure will be triggered. When the
task initiator has collected the sensory data, the rewards
allocation procedure will start to execute. Smart contracts
can guarantee the automation and security of MCS frame-
work.
• Studying the features of the sensory data market and
the participants. This work classifies the participants into
monthly-pay participants, instant-pay participants, and
the task initiator. It provides an economic approach to
analyse the incentive mechanism. By leveraging a three-
stage Stackelberg game reward mechanism, it can achieve
a fair and efficient sensory data market in MCS.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
presents the related work. The blockchain-based MCS frame-
work and smart contracts are introduced in Section III. The
three-stage Stackelberg game and the incentive mechanism
are presented in Section IV, respectively. The performance
and simulation of the mechanism are analysed in Section VI.
This paper also identifies the future challenges of blockchain-
based sensing technology in Section VII. In Section VIII, the
conclusions of this work are presented.
II. RELATED WORK
This work adopts the blockchain in cooperation with MCS
to deploy an automated, secured sensing paradigm. Blockchain
technology with its disruptive features has made it possible to
connect the world seamlessly, including computers, sensors,
smartphones, tablets, and wearable devices. Application sce-
narios of blockchain technology are not merely limited to the
financial sector as before. New applications, such as energy
supplement chain, secure information transmission, and so on,
have also emerged.
IoT and MCS applications have deployed in the distributed
fashion. The deployment depends on a centric server to
support the sensing tasks, which is in danger of single point
failure. Furthermore, in an environment with a large number of
sensors, the traditional framework is short of proper security
guarantee. By adopting blockchain technology, it would solve
the challenges of traditional IoT faces. [20] surveyed research
issues and the challenges of IoT security aspects in cooperation
with the blockchain technology. Kshetri et al. [21] proposed
a blockchain-based identity and access management systems,
which can be leveraged to strengthen IoT security. As defined
in this work, many companies have joined a group which
hopes to establish a blockchain protocol to build IoT devices,
applications, and networks. Christidis et al. [22] adopted
blockchain technology into IoT, which used a smart contract to
deploy the automation of the complex multi-process in IoT. Al-
phand et al. [23] proposed IoTChain, a scheme that combined
the object security architecture (OSCAR) for the IoT and the
authentication and authorisation for constrained environment
(ACE) framework to provide an end-to-end solution for secure
authorised access to IoT resources. This paper addressed the
details of the whole framework and the authorisation flow. It
simulated the proposed framework with an Ethereum private
testnet. Zhang et al. [24] proposed a blockchain-based IoT
in E-business aspect to support the feature of decentralisation
and traceability. Cao et al. [25] discussed the main ideas of the
consensus mechanisms and their limitations in IoT. Blockchain
can solve the authentication of IoT devices, because it uses
consensus mechanism to verify the identities of the IoT devices
without the third party. However the consensus mechanism of
sensing task execution has not been well investigated in these
works. Thus, it motivates us to consider to propose a secure
task execution by leveraging blockchain.
Related works on the collaboration of MCS and blockchain
were proposed to provide secure sensing procedure to MCS.
Li et al. [26] proposed a novel framework of blockchain
and crowdsensing, which deployed a software prototype on
Ethereum. In [27], a privacy-preserved incentive mechanism
was proposed for crowdsourcing applications. This work used
a series of encryption algorithms to solve the security issues
in crowdsourcing. Delgado et al. [28] presented Paysense,
a general framework that incentivises user participation and
provides a mechanism to validate the quality of collected data
based on users’ reputation. This work focused on analysing
user participation, data sensing quality and user anonymity.
The related works focused on the improvement of security by
proposing new encryption algorithms. However spatiotempo-
rality is crucial to MCS task, complicated encryption algo-
rithms may lead to long latency. The features of MCS need
to be considered when adopting blockchain.
Related works attempted to provide secure incentive mech-
anism of MCS aided by blockchain. Chatzopoulos et al. [29]
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proposed a truthful, cost-optimal auction that minimises the
payments from the crowdsensing providers to mobile users
based on a blockchain-aided mobile crowdsensing architec-
ture. With the help of four smart contracts, it deployed a
novel incentive mechanism in the blockchain. Feng et al. [30]
investigated the limitation of the existing IoT frameworks and
proposed a purely decentralised platform of crowdsensing by
adopting permissionless blockchain technology. The author
formulated a noncooperative game to analysis the competitive
situations among the sensors. Cai et al. [31] addressed several
challenges including the sensory data’s safeguarding issue,
knowledge monetisation and streamlined sensory data in the
crowdsensing scenario. This work proposed a crowdsensing
framework that enables privacy-preserving knowledge discov-
ery and full-fledged blockchain-based knowledge monetisa-
tion. However, it did not give the detail on how to allocate
the reward to each participant. Shi et al. [32] proposed a
fault-tolerant incentivisation mechanism for mobile P2P crowd
service (MPCS). They designed an MPCSToken smart contract
to facilitate the service auction, task execution and payment
settlement process with the help of blockchain technology. Jia
et al. [33] proposed a blockchain-based location privacy pro-
tection incentive mechanism in MCS. It took privacy protec-
tion as a supplement of the monetary incentive mechanism and
addressed the problem in a cryptographic approach. However,
related works only used the classic incentive mechanisms,
such as auction, noncooperative game, and so on, for one
time stimulation. They have not considered to provide MCS
application sustainable sensory data. The related works have
not considered that blockchain can improve security of the
system when the transactions keep growing.
Thus, this motivates us to propose a novel blockchain-based
MCS framework that preserves privacy and which secures
both the sensing process and the incentive mechanism by
leveraging the emergent blockchain technology. Firstly, we
proposed the architecture of the blockchain-based MCS and
its workflow. We design a novel set of smart contracts from
participants’ registration, sensing task execution, to reward
allocation. Based on the framework, we provide the solution of
participants’ privacy and sensing procedure security. Secondly,
different from the related works, we consider the participants
into different roles and propose a three stage Stackelberg
game. This incentive mechanism makes sure the sensory data
is sustainable provided by the participants and the utility of
the task initiator is maximized. Thirdly, we have simulate
the proposed framework on the Ethereum testnet to proof the
efficiency.
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED MCS FRAMEWORK
A. The architecture of blockchain-based MCS
This section introduces the framework of blockchain-based
MCS and the entities in the framework. In an MCS scenario,
a task initiator would like to collect as much good quality
sensory data as possible under a specific budget. In some
particular application, he even prefers long-term sensory data
gathering. Thus according to an enterprise system, we classify
the workers (participants) in MCS into contract workers who
Fig. 1. Architecture of blockchain-based MCS
are paid monthly and temporary workers who are paid in-
stantly after work. In this case, contract workers will contribute
the sensory data in a long-term and stable manner and the
temporary worker can make compensation whether when the
budget is limited, or the sensory data is not sufficient. In
the following paper, we will call contract workers ”monthly-
pay participants”, and temporary workers ”instant-pay partic-
ipants”. Thus this framework includes:
1) Task initiator: The initiator who publishes the sensing
task and allocates the reward to monthly-pay and instant-
pay participants through blockchain.
2) Participant: The participants are classified into two dif-
ferent roles, participants who will get paid instant after
finishing the sensing task and participants who will get
paid monthly. The instant-pay participants’ reward is
according to the sensory data quality and his reputation,
the monthly-pay participants’ reward is their salaries
according to the number of the task they accomplish
and their reputation.
3) Miner: Adding authorised miners aims to verify all the
participants’ identity and transactions between them. In
this scenario, the hybrid base stations serve as autho-
rised miners in blockchain-based MCS. A hybrid base
station not only can execute the communication, but also
server as storage and computation resource. By using
blockchain, task initiator, participants and miners are
on the blockchain working in cooperation anonymously.
Besides the authorised miners also verify the identities
of the task initiator and participants before continuing
the sensing task of MCS. Smart contracts are deployed
on the miners for the sensing task execution. The miners
store all the blocks in the storage, thus they are in
charge of verifying the registration of task initiator and
participants, transactions, quality control of sensory data.
The architecture of blockchain-based MCS shows in Fig. 1.
This work proposes a three-layer architecture for blockchain-
based MCS, which consists of data plane, blockchain plane
and application plane. Fundamental functions, such as sensing,
data forwarding, and storing, can be operated on data plane
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Fig. 2. Structure of block in blockchain-based MCS
by smartphone users. This architecture introduces an extra
abstract layer called blockchain plane to help an MCS applica-
tion to verify the identities of participants, allocate the sensing
task/rewards, operate the transactions and control the sensory
data quality. Application plane can deal with the request from
a specific organisation and process the sensory data to extract
the knowledge.
In this work, hybrid base stations are equipped with servers
and capable to operate communication and computation tasks.
The miners store the whole blockchain information locally.
The blockchain and the structure of a block are shown in Fig.
2. The chain in the miner starts with a genesis block. The new
blocks the system generates are appended after the genesis
block. In each block, it consists the block head, the previous
hash of the block, time stamp, state root, transactions root,
and so on. The state root and the transactions root are the root
of Merkel tree. The transactions root stores all the hash value
of the transactions between the participants. In the state root,
it includes the contract hash, which is the hash value of the
smart contract, balance, and the storage root. All the actual
data is stored in distributed data base, which could be in the
server of the hybrid base station.
B. The workflow of blockchain-based MCS
This section presents the workflow of blockchain-based
MCS. Fig. 3 depicts the workflow of smart contracts be-
tween each entity in blockchain-based MCS. The task initiator
communicates with the participants through the set of smart
contracts, which are deployed on the miner. The details of the
smart contracts will be introduced in the following section. We
assume that the participants (including the task initiator) have
registered and enrolled with the certificate authority (CA) and
received back necessary cryptographic material, which is used
to authenticate when sensing task starts.
1) System initializaiton: Task initiator and participants
sign in for the MCS application. They will send their
identities, public/private keys, certificates, etc. to the
closest miner. The miner will run the ”Registration
Contract”, and verify the identities of the participants
and the task initiator with other miners by consensus
Fig. 3. Workflow of blockchain-based MCS
mechanism. And then the miners will send confirmations
to the task initiator if the participants’ identities are
valid. When the registration procedure completes, it
will trigger the next step. Task initiator will send the
description of the sensing task to the corresponding
miners. The miners will verify the sensing task, and
then broadcast the sensing task to all the registered
participants.
2) Incentive mechanism deployment (three-stage Stack-
elberg game): After system initialisation, the role of
each identity will be clarified. Thus the incentive mech-
anism will be triggered by running the ”Participant
Profile Contract” and the ”Sensing Task Contract”. We
will introduce this procedure in detail in the following
sections.
3) Token allocation: After the incentive mechanism com-
pletes, all the participants receive the message of the
reward, size of the sensory data. They need to inspect
the message, if the message is legitimate, then they
execute the sensing task according to the reward. Each
of the participants will be allocated with a token, which
indicates the sensing task and reward. For this function,
we set a ”credit & token bank” in every miner to enable
token allocation.
4) Sensory data uploading: Since every participant has
had the promised reward for accomplishing the sensing
task, they will upload the promised sensory data to
the task initiator via miner. At this step, instant-pay
participants will get their reward from the credit bank
of the miner.
5) New block generation: The miners will process the
proof-of-work and build the new block with all the trans-
actions of the sensing task on the chain. The new block
will be audited and finally added on the blockchain.
6) Token redemption and task accomplishment: After
the new block is added, all the participants have the
tokens, and the sensing task completes, the tokens will
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be redeemed whenever or wherever the participants
need.
C. Smart contracts of blockchain-base MCS
The concept of the smart contract was firstly introduced in
1997 [19]. A smart contract is an agreement, which tells each
party how to act when they trust each other. We assume that
all the smart contracts are authorized before deployment. In
the proposed blockchain-based MCS framework, a novel set of
smart contracts is designed to operate the the transactions and
verification. According to the workflow of blockchain-based
MCS, the novel set of smart contracts are proposed.
1) Registration contract: All the participants including task
initiator register run registration contract as it shows in
TABLE. I. All the participants will send their address
and roles in the secure communication channel to the
miner to verify their identities. After the consensus
among the miners finishes, the participants without the
legitimate signature will be detected. This paper omits
the technical details of cryptography algorithms in the
blockchain. We adopt the asymmetric cryptography al-
gorithms to provide the secure communication channel.
TABLE I
REGISTRATION CONTRACT
ID Address Type
P1 Addr{P1} Initiator
P2 Addr{P2} Instant-pay participant
P3 Addr{P3} Monthly-pay participant
P4 Addr{P4} Miner
2) Participant profile contract: When the miners collect all
the information from the participants, their profile will
be built to assist the participant selection procedure,
sensing task execution procedure and rewards allocation
procedure. A participant’s profile contains the partici-
pant’s reputation, expecting the reward of sensing task,
participant’s status and so on, as it is shown in TABLE.
II.
TABLE II
PARTICIPANT PROFILE CONTRACT
Address Profile
Sensing
Task ID
Reward of Task
Addr{P1} Profile{P1} T1 R1
Addr{P2} Profile{P2} t1 r1
Addr{P3} Profile{P3} t2 r2
Addr{P4} Profile{P4} t2 0
3) Sensing task contract: The sensing task contract consists
the ID, execution status, deposit and rewards plan of
sensing tasks. The execution status of a sensing task
is a binary variable in TABLE. III. When the status
is 0, it means the sensing task is unfinished and vice
versa. There are also parameters, such as sensing task’s
deposit which can guarantee the promised rewards to the
participants and its reward plan which gives guidance of
rewards allocation.
TABLE III
SENSING TASK CONTRACT
Sensing
Task ID
Status Deposit Reward Plan
T1 0 D1 R1
T2 1 D2 R2
4) Profit Evaluation Contract: When the participants regis-
ter on the chain, the miners obtain all the information to
evaluate the rewards allocation plan by running the profit
evaluation contract. Due to the deployment of the three-
stage Stackelberg game, all the participants, including
the task initiator have the profit evaluation contract to
calculate if a specific scenario will maximise their profit,
according to equation (1), (3) and (4). This procedure
will be introduced in the following sections. We denote
U(·) as the profit function of participant with sensing
plan in TABLE. IV.
TABLE IV
PROFIT EVALUATION CONTRACT
ID
Expecting
reward
Sensing
task ID
Device
ability
Profit U(·)
P1 r1 T1 D(P1) U1(·)
P2 r2 T2 D(P2) U2(·)
5) Sensing Task Execution Contract: When the participants
calculate the maximum profit according to the details
of the sensing task, reward and so on, they will obtain
the sensing plan, including the quality of sensory data
and the sensory data size. The participants will follow
the sensing task execution contract, in TABLE. V, to
execute the sensing task. So the sensing task execution
contract will be triggered.
TABLE V
SENSING TASK EXECUTION CONTRACT
ID Profit U(·) Sensing task ID Status
P1 U1(·) T1 0
P2 U2(·) T2 1
6) Reward allocation contract: The key algorithms of this
paper will be deployed in a sensing task contract accord-
ing to the participant profile contract. This algorithm
will give the result of the reward plan of the sensing
task. Meanwhile, during this procedure, reward will be
allocated as tokens to the participants, which is enabled
by the reward allocation contract in TABLE. VI.
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TABLE VI
REWARD ALLOCATION CONTRACT
Sensing Task ID Status Participant’s ID Token
T1 0 P1 Token1
T2 1 P2 Token2
D. Consensus mechanism of blockchain-base MCS
In this work, we use Proof-of-Work (PoW) as the consensus
mechanism. PoW requires a great amount of computation
power to create a set of transactions (the block). PoW is
the practice of solving block equations to verify if the each
transaction is legitimate in the block. The miner starts PoW
by choosing a number ”nonce”, along with the hash of the
previous block, and the Merkel root, he could get an answer of
the equation. He repeats changing the ”nonce” till he calculate
the right answer. Once the PoW completes, the block of
transactions is confirmed and becomes public. PoW can reduce
the risk of a 51% attack, because the equation is very hard to
solve. And it doesn’t rely on any third party, which enables
to build a transparent network.
In this work, we adopt the PoW in Ethereum without any
optimization. In future work, our study will be focused on the
distributed consensus mechanism.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL OF THE INCENTIVE MECHANISM
The incentive mechanism is the crucial research aspect in
the MCS. A task initiator can obtain the sensory data and
price the sensory data in the MCS framework as a sensory
data market. A sensory data market should conform to market
rules. Thus adopting a primary economic method is necessary.
In blockchain-based MCS, the framework consists of a
set p of participants. We consider a set of the instant-pay
participants as pI = {1, 2, ..., pI} and a set of the monthly-pay
as pM = {pI+1, pI+2, ..., pI+pM}, where pI⋃pM = p. In
this scenario, there exists multiple hybrid base stations acting
as miners. We denote miner as m = {1, 2, ...,m}. A task
initiator will publish a sensing task t = (R,D,B) to the
participants. Here D denotes the required sensory data size,
R denotes the reputation of the participants, and B denotes
the budget of reward. The sensory data size each participant
in pI and pM provides is d = {d1, ..., dpI , ..., dpI+pM }.
In this blockchain-based MCS sensory data market, to have
more sustainable participants for sensing tasks, task initiator
prefers more monthly-pay participants. Thus, in the first stage
of the game, monthly-pay participants dominate the market
over task initiator. In the second stage, task initiator should
dominate the market when he/she negotiates with instant-
pay participants. In the third stage, instant-pay participants
adjust the sensory data size according to the reward the task
initiator provides. The formal definitions of the players and
their strategies in the three-stage Stackelberg game [34] are as
following.
• Monthly-pay participant signs in for long-term and
gets paid monthly. The strategy profile of monthly-
pay participants are their salary, which denote as a set
TABLE VII
NOTATION AND DESCRIPTIONS
Notation Description
p A set of participants
pI A set of instant-pay participants
pM A set of monthly-pay participants
m A set of base stations / miners
d A set of sensory data size
Rp Reputation of participant p
r A set of payment/reward to participants
α Market domination indicator
γ Default value of reputation
ωp
Processing ability of sensing device
in participant set p
β Network condition
B Reward Budget of task initiator
D Total sensory data size of the task
rpM = {rpI+1, ..., rpI+pM }. They can only redeem their
payments monthly;
• Task initiator who starts a sensing task, selects the
monthly-pay participants according to the sensing task’s
requirements, and then offers the instant-pay participants
the reward to execute the sensing task. Thus the strategy
profile of task initiator includes two parts: sensory data
size dpM = {dpI+1, ..., dpI+pM } and the reward to
instant-pay participants rpI = {r1, ..., rpI};
• Instant-pay participant who gets paid after each task
according to the sensory data size and reputation. Accord-
ing to the reward offered by the task initiator, instant-pay
participants can decide the sensory data size. The strategy
profile is the sensory data size dpI = {d1, ..., dpI}.
A. Problem formulation
1) Utility of task initiator: A task initiator aims to maximise
his profit which consists of two parts: revenue by accomplish-
ing the sensing task and cost by paying the participants. When
a task initiator announces a sensing task to all the participants,
they must have a set of specific parameters to guarantee the
quality of the result of the sensing task. Moreover, task initiator
will take the reputation [14], [35], [36] of participant into
consideration as well. Task initiator will have a set of payment
r = {r1, ..., rpl , ..., rpI+pM } to participants, where r is the
value of one unit of the sensory data. We also denote the
data quantity as d = {d1, ..., dpl , ..., dpI+pM }. Let di denote
as instant-pay participants where i ∈ pI and dj denote as
monthly-pay participants where j ∈ pM.
In order to obtain long and stable sensory data, a sensing
task initiator is willing to recruit more monthly-pay partic-
ipants. Instant-pay participants are part-time workers, who
complement the sensory data market. For example when the
budget is limited, possibly more instant-pay participants will
join the market. Thus, in this model monthly-pay participants
will dominate the market. In this paper, the Stackelberg game
is adopted to naturally grand monthly-pay participants the
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”first mover advantage”, which means the first mover in the
game will dominate the market [37].
The profit a task initiator can gain depends on the sensory
data size di and dj , the reputation of the participants Ri and
Rj , and his expense to pay them ri and rj as well. The utility
function of the task initiator is defined as:
UI =
∑
i∈pI
dih(Ri)+
∑
j∈pM
dj
2h(Rj)−(
∑
i∈pI
ridi+
∑
j∈pM
rjdj)
(1)
where h(·) is the reputation function of participants. Note that
we have added quadratic dj , which indicates the task initiator
prefers monthly-pay participants to obtain more income. The
reputation function [38] h(·) of the participants p is defined
as:
h(Rp) =
{
γ + (1− γ)ln(1 + ε) if R ≤ Rp ≤ Rmax
γe(Rp−R) if Rmin ≤ Rp ≤ R
(2)
where γ is a default value, R is the required reputation of the
task initiator. Here ε = (e−1)(Rp−R)Rmax−R . The reputation function
implies that when the reputation of a participant is lower than
the required reputation of the sensing task, h(·) will decrease
sharply, conversely h(·) will markedly increase.
2) Utility of monthly-pay participant: The utility function
of the participant j ∈ pM who gets paid monthly is based on
the sensory data size dj and the cost of sensing and uploading.
We assume that every participant keeps the sensing history on
record to estimate the expecting salary for the next month and
then report the salary to the task initiator. Thus we have the
utility function of monthly-pay participant j
UPMj = rjdj − [sj(dj , Rj) + u(dj)] (3)
where sj(·) is function of sensing cost and u(·) is function of
sensory data uploading cost. Function sj(·) and u(·) increase
as the size of sensory data increases. A rational participant
will keep his utility function positive.
3) Utility of instant-pay participant: Instant-pay participant
i ∈ pI will receive a reward offer from task initiator. Then
according to the reward, he will decide the sensory data size
di he can contribute to the task initiator. The revenue for pIi
will be the reward ri he/she can get after accomplishing a
single sensory task. The cost depends on the size of sensory
data di, participant’s reputation h(Ri) and the uploading cost
u(di). The objective of the participants is to maximise their
individual expected utility. Thus the utility function UPIi of
instant-pay participant i is:
UPIi = ridi − [si(di, Ri) + u(di)] (4)
Furthermore, the sensing cost function si(·) and sensory data
uploading function u(·) are defined in detail:
si(di, Ri) = ωi · h(Ri)di2 (5)
sj(dj , Rj) = ωj · h(Rj)dj (6)
u(dp) = β · dp (7)
where ωp represents the processing ability of the sensing
devices, which is the CPU ability of encoding the data before
sending it out. The network condition denoted as β, which
means that a greater β indicates a poorer network condition,
it will require more cost to upload the sensory data. Note
that we design different sensing cost function for different
participants, the instant-pay participants will have greater cost
comparing to the monthly-pay participants, because the task
initiator prefers more monthly-pay participants in the system.
V. THREE-STAGE GAME AND EQUILIBRIUM
This section will present the solution of the three-stage
Stackelberg game. This game aims to maximise the utility of
task initiator and maximise the utility of the participants, at
the same time achieve the maximum sensory data quality.
To solve a traditional Stackelberg game, we adopt back-
wards induction which solves the equilibria of the subgames
first. In the three-stage Stackelberg game, there are three
subgames, which means we need to obtain three perfect
equilibria [39] of the three subgames.
A. Subgames equilibria and Stackelberg equilibrium
For every player i with strategy profile τi, we assume the
state after executing strategy profile τi is Oh(τi) according to
history h.
Definition (Subgame perfect equilibrium) The strategy
profile τ∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if, the utility
of state Oh(τ∗) is at least as good as the utility of state
Oh(τi, τ
∗
−i), where the strategy profile (τi, τ
∗
−i) represents
player i chooses τi while every other player −i chooses τ∗−i.
Equivalently, for every player i and every history h after which
it is player i’s turn to move,
Ui(Oh(τ
∗)) ≥ Ui(Oh(τi, τ∗−i)) (8)
where Ui is a utiltiy function that represents player i’s pref-
erences.
The definition above is the general definition for subgame
perfect equilibrium. For example, in this work, when an
instant-pay participant wants to decide his strategy of sensory
data size di, he will take the previous stage’s strategy as given,
which is the reward strategy ri from task initiator, to derive
his optimal strategy di∗. The subgame perfect equilibrium can
be interpreted in the following two aspects:
• The subgame is Nash Equilibrium, so the follower’s
strategy is optimal, given the leader’s strategy.
In three-stage Stackelberg game, the leader is monthly-
pay participants, and follower is task initiator in stage I.
Then the leader is task initiator, and the followers are the
instant-pay participants in stage II. Finally, the players are
an instant-pay participants in non-cooperate game stage
III. Thus in this three-stage Stackelberg game, the Nash
equilibrium can be obtained.
• According to the strategy history, the followers’ strat-
egy is optimal.
As it is in a Stackelberg game, the subgame will play
dynamically. According to the strategy history and pref-
erences of the leader, the followers will repeatedly engage
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in the same game with different strategy profile until they
reach the optimal solutions.
When every subgame can admit a subgame perfect equilib-
rium, the Stackelberg game achieves the Stackelberg equilib-
rium. Now we give the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium
of the proposed game.
Definition (Stackelberg equilibrium) The strategy profile
(r∗pM ,d
∗
pM , r
∗
pI ,d
∗
pI) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if it satisfies
UPI(d∗pI) ≥ UPI(di,d∗−i) (9)
U I(d∗pM , r
∗
pI) ≥ U I(dj ,d∗−j , ri, r∗−i) (10)
UPM (r∗pM) ≥ UPM (rj , r∗−j) (11)
where d∗pI is the equilibrium sensory data size strategies of
instant-pay participants, di is the sensory data size strategy
of participant i, d∗−i is the equilibrium strategies of all the
participants expect participant i in (9). The rest of the notation
in (10) and (11) has the same meaning as in (9). (9), (10)
and (11) are subgame equilibria of stage III, stage II and
stage I, respectively, in the whole Stackelberg game. When
all the subgames admit perfect equilibria, we derive the
Stackelberg equilibrium. The subgame perfect equilibria of the
three subgames will be analysed in the following sections.
B. Stage III: Instant-pay participants’ strategy profile
According to backward induction, the task initiator’s reward
plan rpI is taken as given to solve the profit maximisation
problem of instant-pay participants in Stage III. According to
equation (4), (5) and (7)
max
di∈dpI
UPIi = ridi − ωih(Ri)di2 − βdi (12)
s.t. UPIi > 0
Ri≥ R
where h(·) is defined in (2). Firstly, the utility function
should be greater than 0, because every participant is rational.
Secondly, there is a requirement in the sensing task description
which indicates the participants’ reputation to fulfil R. (12) is
concave maximisation problem in strategy space [dmin, dmax].
According to the derivation of di, the optimal di∗ is
di
∗ =
ri − β
2wih(Ri)
(13)
The optimal strategy profile of sensory data size d∗i (ri) of
instant-pay participant i obtains, which is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This work assumes that the task initiator will set
a minimum sensory data size dmin for every participant and
participants’ sensing ability is fixed which is not more than
dmax.
C. Stage II: Task initiator’s strategy profile
Given salary plan rpM of monthly-pay participants, task
initiator aims to maximise his profit by deciding the equilib-
rium strategy profile of reward rpI for instant-pay participants
and the strategy profile of the sensory data size ddM for
monthly-pay participants. Since the salary plan of monthly-
pay participants is given, the sensory data size of them obtains.
According to (3), (6) and (7)
max
ri∈rpI ,dj∈dpM
U I (14)
s.t.
∑
i ri +
∑
j rj≤ B∑
i di +
∑
j dj≥ D
dj≤ Dmaxj
U I> 0
The first constraint is the total reward to all the participants
is under budget B. The second constraint means that the total
sensory data size is greater than the required sensory data size
D. The third constraint is the sensory data of monthly-pay
participants contributes can not exceed the maximum sensory
data Dmaxj . The last constraint requires the utility should not
below 0. It shows the concavity of (14) and the convexity of
the constraints. Thus it is a concave maximisation problem.
Given monthly-pay participants’ strategy rj and the optimal
data strategy di∗ of instant-pay participants from (13), the
Lagrange function of (14) is:
L(rpI ,dpM , λ, µ, κpM)
= −
∑
i∈pI
ri(ri − β)
2wih(Ri)
−
∑
j∈pM
rjdj + (
∑
i∈pI
ri − β
2wih(Ri)
h(Ri)
+
∑
j∈pM
ηdj
2h(Rj)) + λ(B −
∑
i∈pI
ri −
∑
j∈pM
rj)
+ µ(
∑
i∈pI
ri − β
2wih(Ri)
+
∑
j∈pM
dj −D) +
∑
j∈pM
κj(D
max
j − dj)
(15)
where λ, µ and κpM are non-negative Lagrange multipliers
associated with constraints in (14). According to (15), we can
solve ri and dj from (14) by the derivations of all the ri and
all the dj , respectively.
By adopting Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions [40],
the optimal strategy profile of instant-pay participants’ reward
rpI
∗(rj) and dpM
∗(rj) can be obtained by solving linear
equations. The results depend on rj from Stage I. The subgame
perfect equilibrium can be derived by obtaining the optimal
value in Stage II.
Lemma 1. In Stage II, given the strategy rpM of monthly-
pay participants, the task initiator’s optimal strategy can be
obtained.
The solution of Stage II and proof of Lemma 1 can be found
in Appendix. A.
D. Stage I: monthly-pay participants’ strategy profile
In Stage I, given the monthly-pay sensory data strategy of
dpM(rpM), monthly-pay participants will adjust their salary
strategy rpM to maximise their profit function. According to
(3), that is
max
rj∈rpM
UPMj = rjdj − ωjh(Rj)dj − βdj (16)
s.t. UPMj > 0
Rj≥ RbI
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where h(·) is defined in (2). According to equation (28), the
optimal data size strategy dpM
∗(rj) of monthly-pay partici-
pant is an increasing function on rj , as a result, the objective
function in (16) is convex. Due to the constraints, the optimal
salary strategy for monthly-pay participants can be obtained.
Lemma 2. In Stage I, the strategy rpM of monthly-pay
participants satisfies
Uj(r
∗
pM) ≥ Uj(rj , r∗−j) (17)
By analysing the optimal strategy dpM
∗ in equation (28),
the salary of one monthly-pay participant relates with all
the other monthly-pay participants. This indicates that the
subgame in Stage I is a cooperative game, which means the
co-workers (monthly-pay participants) work in the union form
and fight for each other for a better salary. The optimal strategy
rpM
∗ can be achieved.
• When d∗j = D
max
j , the objective function is an increasing
function, thus r∗j = r
max
j .
• When d∗j =
rj
2h(Rj)
, the objective function is
UPMj =
r2j
2h(Rj)
− ωjh(Rj) rj
2h(Rj)
− β rj
2h(Rj)
and it is concave, thus r∗j = r
max
j .
• When
d∗j = ξ(D − τ +
∑
i∈pL
Ai
∑
j∈pM
rj +
∑
j∈pM
rj−rj−1
2h(Rj−1)
),
d∗j is a function on
∑
j rj , which is d
∗
j =
∑
j rj . The
objective function is a binary primary concave function,
at the same time the constant terms are all greater than
zero. Thus r∗j is in the range of [r
min
j , r
max
j ].
Thus the optimal strategy rj∗ of monthly-pay participants of
Stage I can be obtained. The subgame equilibrium of Stage I
can be reached in the situations above.
E. Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Theorem 1. (Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium)
Every finite extensive game with perfect information has a
subgame equilibrium.
Proof 1. The proposed three-stage Stackelberg game is an
extensive game with all the given information, also it is with
a finite strategy space, such as [dmin, dmax] and [rmin, rmax].
Thus the subgame equilibrium can be obtained.
Theorem 2. (Existence of Stackelberg Equilibrium) There
exists Stackelberg equilibrium in the proposed three-stage
game.
Proof 2.The existence of Stackelberg equilibrium depends
on the subgame perfect equilibrium. In the proposed three-
stage game, the set of subgame perfect equilibria of a finite
strategy space extensive game with perfect information is
equal to the set of strategy profiles isolated by the procedure
of backward induction [39]. According to the analysis of the
proposed three-stage game, Stackelberg equilibrium can be
obtained.
VI. SIMULATION
This section presents the simulation results of the pro-
posed framework in two aspects. We first evaluate the three-
stage Stackelberg algorithms. And then the performance of
blockchain-based MCS architecture is assessed by Ethereum
testnet.
A. Incentive mechanism performance analysis
To benchmark the performance of the proposed algorithm,
we implement the traditional Stackelberg algorithm [11] and
the greedy reward allocation algorithm. Notice that the tradi-
tional Stackelberg algorithm takes only one kind of partici-
pants, and the greedy algorithm is centralized. We show the
dynamics of the task initiator’s utility in terms of different
sensory data requirement with limited budget. Fig. 4(a) shows
that when the size of the sensing task increases, the task
initiator’s utility decreases slower than 2-stage and the greedy
algorithm. Fig. 4(b) demonstrates the three different algorithms
with different budget and the same size of sensing task.
We observe that when the budget increases, the proposed
algorithm can achieve higher initiator’s utility. It can provide
the sensory data market with a reasonable pricing strategy,
which leads the system to a better utility. To investigate the
impact of sensory data size and budget, we then implement
the simulations with different size of sensory data requirement
B in Fig. 5(a). We see that when the size of the sensing
task increases, the task initiator’s utility decreases. However
the utility of monthly-pay participants increases. There is
a joint point when the size is 105 MB, which means the
equilibrium point in this setting of the simulation. When the
size of the sensing task is too big, there is not enough budget,
which makes the utilities become zero. We also implement the
simulations with different budget D in Fig. 5(b). We see that
when the budget increases, the utilities become stable. Because
the computation ability of the participants is bounded.
Fig. 6(a) demonstrates the domination of monthly-pay par-
ticipants in the proposed sensory data market considering
a scenario with different CPU ability wj of monthly-pay
participants. With higher CPU ability, the sensing cost will
increase for monthly-pay participants, then more instant-pay
participants will join the sensing task. However, because of the
”first mover’s advantage” of monthly-pay participants, they
will still dominate the sensory data market. For a further
understanding of the ”first-mover advantage” and the sensory
data market share, this paper evaluates the proposed model
with different ratio of monthly-pay participants and instant-
pay participants considering 20 participants in this scenario
with sensory data amount of 50MB, 60MB and 70MB. As
shown in Fig. 6(b), when the ratio increases, the task initiator’s
utility gradually increases. However, with a small sensory data
amount requirement, the utility stays stable at some point.
The result is because the ratio of participants is sufficient for
the specific scenario. To verify that the proposed algorithms
can reach convergent, we further the dynamic of the reward
for participants in Fig. 7. There are 20 participants with
500 units of reward and 200 units of sensory data. The
proposed algorithm obtains the optimal reward strategy within
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ten iterations. The result of the simulation infers the feasibility
of the proposed strategy in real life.
B. Blockchain performance analysis
Previous simulations on mobile devices based blockchain
have been done in [41]. In this section, the performance
of the proposed blockchain-based MCS has been presented.
We implemented the Ethereum testnet on a computer with
Intel Core i5 CPU @ 1.3 GHz and 4 GB of RAM. The
simulation considers a blockchain-based MCS including dif-
ferent numbers of the monthly-pay participants and instant-pay
participants, three miner, and one task initiator, which makes
the topology of the MCS. In this topology, every participant
can communicate with the miner and each other.
Firstly miners will run the Registration contract to register
all the participants, including monthly-pay/instant-pay partici-
pants and task initiator. Secondly, after the miners consent the
participants’ identities by consensus mechanism, The miners
will broadcast the sensing task and run the Participant profile
contract and the Sensing task contract to negotiate with task
initiator. Thirdly all the miners will run the Profit evaluation
contract to compute their optimal strategy individually and ex-
ecute the sensing task by the Sensing task execution contract.
At last, the miners will run the Reward allocation contract to
compensate all the participants. Periodically, the miners will
verify all the transactions and build a new block. As shown
in Fig. 8, we deploy the contracts of the blockchain-based
MCS framework, including the key functions, such as system
initialization, verification, the three-stage game algorithms,
and mining. It demonstrates the proposed framework with
a different number of participants. With the expansion, the
proposed framework still shows a tolerable latency of each
function.
VII. FUTURE CHALLENGES
Blockchain technology has shown significant influence in
the Internet of Things, Internet of Vehicles and Mobile Crowd-
sensing with the advantages of decentralisation, trustworthi-
ness, traceability, flexibility and so on. However, there are still
open issues need to be considered in the future when adopting
blockchain technology into MCS.
The Computation overhead of Blockchain-based MCS.
Mobile devices work as sensors in the MCS with limited power
supplement, computation capacity and storage, with complex
communication networks conditions at the same time. For the
sensing and personal data privacy, blockchain will adopt more
complicated cryptographic algorithms to resolve the issue,
which mobile devices could not afford. Xiong et al. [42]
considered edge computing as the network enabler for mobile
blockchain. However, this work focused mostly on the pricing
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scheme of edge computing resources, but not the details
in cooperation with blockchain technology. Moreover, MCS
requires real-time sensory data, which also enhance the need
for high computation capacity. The challenge is improving the
performance of the blockchain-based MCS without sacrificing
the security feature of the system.
Privacy and trustworthiness of blockchain-based MCS.
Although MCS is a novel form of traditional IoT, it has
unique features, such as the selfishness, mobility, intelligence
of the users of the mobile devices. These features add more
requirements when it comes to privacy guarantee. In future
research, dynamic access control is a crucial function to
guarantee the security in blockchain-based MCS where mobile
devices users may join the sensing task anytime and anywhere,
due to mobility.
Human-in-the-loop framework. MCS is a human-centric
sensing framework. With the feature of automation in
blockchain, the human-centric feature can drift the framework
from autonomy to intelligence by leveraging human-in-the-
loop. For example, by designing a human-centric trust model
[43], an MCS funded by grass-rooted participants can perform
services like an expert.
Sensory data market. MCS needs rational incentive mech-
anisms to stimulate mobile devices users to participate in
sensing tasks. Pricing the sensory data is one of the essential
incentive mechanism in MCS. According to the applica-
tions of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin,
a blockchain-based sensory data market will make sure that
the pricing scheme is fair and secure.
Trade-off among performance, security and resource.
An MCS application requires real-time sensory data from
more participants, which requires higher performance from a
blockchain-based MCS when participants increase. To achieve
high performance and efficient resource allocates while main-
taining a high security level for the system is a crucial task
in blockchain-based MCS. Initial attempt has been made by
Wang et al. [44]. This work proposed asynchronous consensus
zones to scale blockchain system linearly without compromis-
ing security.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The work presented in this paper has two main contributions
towards solving the challenges of MCS. Firstly, it proposes a
blockchain-based MCS framework with a novel set of smart
contracts. Secondly, this work designs a three-stage Stackel-
berg game to maintain the number of participants by consider-
ing this MCS scenario as a sensory data market. In the three-
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stage Stackelberg game, the participants are classified into
monthly-pay participants and instant-pay participants. This
allows the monthly-pay participants to have a guarantee of
the sustainable contribution of the sensory data. Furthermore,
the game preserves the fairness of the sensory data market in
cooperation with a secure reward allocation scheme aided by
blockchain technology.
The simulation of the proposed blockchain-based MCS
framework is twofold. Firstly, we simulate the performance of
the three-stage game. In terms of the utility of the task initiator,
the improvement of the proposed reward strategy ranges from
two to ten percent, under the same participants’ reputation,
compared with the two-stage game. It also ranges from 2
to 20 percent comparing with the average reward strategy.
It can also maintain the required market share for monthly-
pay participants whilst achieving sustainable sensory data
provision. Secondly, we simulate the performance of the block-
based MCS with a set of smart contracts to prove the feasibility
of the proposed work. Finally, this paper also discusses the
future challenges in the cooperation of blockchain technology
and MCS to enlighten future works.
Currently, the bottleneck of blockchain deployment is the
consensus mechanism. Consensus mechanisms, such as the
computationally-intensive PoW, Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT), can not support large numbers of IoT devices. So
in future work, we will study the consensus mechanism of
blockchain to support improved efficiency and scalability.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Based on Lagrange function (15) and according to KKT
conditions, it follows
ri
∂L
∂(ri)
= 0;
∂L
∂(ri)
≤ 0; ri ≥ 0 (18)
dj
∂L
∂(dj)
= 0;
∂L
∂(dj)
≤ 0; dj ≥ 0 (19)
λ(
∑
i∈pL
ri +
∑
j∈pM
rj −B) = 0;∑
i∈pL
ri +
∑
j∈pM
rj −B ≤ 0; λ ≥ 0 (20)
µ(A
∑
i∈pL
ri − β +
∑
j∈pM
dj −Db) = 0;
A
∑
i∈pL
(ri − β) +
∑
j∈pM
dj −Db ≤ 0; µ ≥ 0 (21)∑
j∈pM
κj(D
max
j − dj) = 0;
Dmaxj − dj ≤ 0;
∑
j∈pM
κj ≥ 0 (22)
where (18), (19), (20) and (21) denote the complementary
slackness condition, and (23), (24) are the first-order derivative
conditions of (15) with respect to ri and dj , respectively.
∂L
∂ri
= Aih(Ri)−Ai(2ri − β)− λ+ µAi (23)
∂L
∂ri−1
= Ai−1h(Ri−1)−Ai−1(2ri−1 − β)− λ+ µAi−1
...
∂L
∂dj
= 2djh(Rj)− rj + µ− κj (24)
∂L
∂dj−1
= 2dj−1h(Rj−1)− rj−1 + µ− κj−1
...
∂L
∂λ
=
∑
i∈pL
ri +
∑
j∈pM
rj −B (25)
∂L
∂µ
=
∑
i∈pL
Ai(ri − β) +
∑
j∈pM
dj −D (26)
∂L
∂κj
= Dmaxj − dj (27)
∂L
∂κj−1
= Dmaxj−1 − dj−1
...
where 12wih(Ri) = Ai. And then we will look for the interior
solutions when
• when µ = 0, κj = 0, and λ = 0, by solving the equations
above, we can obtain the optimal strategy
ri
∗ =
1
2
(h(Ri) + β)
dj
∗ =
rj
2hj
when
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ [0, φ].
And when µ = 0, κj = 0, and λ ≥ 0, we can obtain the
optimal strategy ∑
i∈pL
ri
∗ = B −
∑
j∈pM
rj
dj
∗ =
rj
2hj
when
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ψ,
∑
j∈pM r
max
j ).
• when µ > 0, κj ≥ 0, and λ = 0, by solving the equations
above, we can obtain the optimal strategy
ri
∗ =
1
2
(h(Ri) + β)
dj
∗ = Dmaxj
when
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (0, ψ).
And when µ = 0, κj = 0, and λ ≥ 0, we can obtain the
optimal strategy
ri
∗ = wi[D −
∑
j∈pM
Dmaxj −
1
4wi
∑
i∈pL
(h(Ri−1)− h(Ri))]
dj
∗ = Dmaxj
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when
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ψ,
∑
j∈pM r
max
j ).
• When µ > 0, κj = 0, and λ = 0, there is no solution for
this optimisation problem.
And when µ > 0, κj = 0, and λ ≥ 0, we can obtain the
optimal strategy
ri
∗ = wi[D −
∑
j∈pM
Dmaxj −
1
4wi
∑
i∈pL
(h(Ri−1)− h(Ri))]
dj
∗ = ξ(D − τ +
∑
i∈pL
Ai
∑
j∈pM
rj +
∑
j∈pM
rj − rj−1
2h(Rj−1)
)
when
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ϕ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj ).
• When µ > 0, κj ≥ 0, and no matter λ = 0 or λ ≥ 0, we
can obtain the optimal strategy
ri
∗ =
1
4
[2(B −
∑
j∈pM
rj)−
∑
i∈pL
(h(Ri−1)− h(Ri))]
dj
∗ = Dmaxj
when
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ψ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj ).
We can obtain the result
d∗j =

Dmaxj if
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (0, φ)(ψ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj );
rj
2h(Rj)
if
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ψ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj );
ξ(D − τ + ∑
i∈pL
Ai
∑
j∈pM
rj +
∑
j∈pM
rj−rj−1
2h(Rj−1)
)
if
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ϕ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj )
(28)
r∗i =

h(Ri)
2 if
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (0, φ);
1
4 [2(B −
∑
j∈pM
rj)−
∑
i∈pL
(h(Ri−1)− h(Ri))]
if
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ψ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj );
wi[D −
∑
j∈pM
Dmaxj − 14wi
∑
i∈pL
(h(Ri−1)− h(Ri))]
if
∑
j∈pM
rj ∈ (ϕ,
∑
j∈pM
rmaxj )
(29)
where
ξ =
1
1 + h(Rj)
∑
j∈pM
1
h(Rj−1)
τ = B
∑
i∈pL
Ai −
∑
i∈pL
Aiβ
φ = 2
∑
j∈pM
hjD
max
j
ψ = B − 1
2
∑
i∈pL
hi
ϕ =
∑
j∈pM
1
h(Rj)
(D − 1
4wi
∑
i∈pL
hi)
(30)
Until now, this lemma is proved.
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